Alejandro M. Manelli

Papers

Monotonic Preferences and Core Equivalence,
Econometrica 59: 123--138, January 1991.
(doi: 10.2307/2938243)
Core Convergence Without Monotone Preferences and Free Disposal,
Journal of Economic Theory 55: 400--415, 1991.
(doi:10.1016/0022-0531(91)90046-7)
Trademark Protection and Post-Patent Competition,
with Katherine Rockett and Pierre Regibeau, Cuadernos Economicos del ICE 57: 115--139, 1994, in Spanish.
(English version)
Optimal Procurement Mechanisms,
with Daniel R. Vincent, Econometrica 63: 591--620, 1995.
(doi:10.2307/2171909)
The Convergence of Equilibrium Strategies of Approximating Signaling Games,
Economic Theory , 7 : 323--335, 1996.
(doi:10.1007/BF01213909)
Cheap Talk and Sequential Equilibria in Signaling Games,
Econometrica 64: 917--942, 1996.
(doi: 10.2307/2171850)
A working paper version with Karl Iorio, Northwestern University, CMS-EMS working paper 915, December 1990.
The Never-a-Weak-Best-Response Test in Signaling Games,
Journal of Economic Theory , 74: 152--173, 1997.
(doi:10.1006/jeth.1996.2248)
Approximately Competitive Equilibria in Large Finite Economies,
with Matthew Jackson, Journal of Economic Theory, 77: 354--376, 1997.
(doi:10.1006/jeth.1997.2327)
Subgame Perfect Equilibria in Stage Games,
Journal of Economic Theory, 102: 480--484, 2002.
(doi:10.1006/jeth.2001.2812)
Duality in Procurement Design,
with Daniel R. Vincent, Journal of Mathematical Economics, 40: 411--428, 2004.
(doi:10.1016/j.jmateco.2003.11.005)
Bundling as an Optimal Selling Mechanism for a Multiple-Good Monopolist,
with Daniel R. Vincent, Journal of Economic Theory, 127: 1--35, 2006.
(doi:10.1016/j.jet.2005.08.007)
Multi-Unit Auctions: A Comparison of Static and Dynamic Mechanisms,
with Martin Sefton and Benjamin S. Wilner, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 61: 304--323, 2006.
(doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2005.04.014)
Multidimensional Mechanism Design: Revenue Maximization and the Multiple-Good Monopoly,
with Daniel R. Vincent, Journal of Economic Theory, 137: 153--185, 2007.
(doi:10.1016/j.jet.2006.12.007)
English Auctions and the Stolper-Samuelson Theorem,
with Juan Dubra and Federico Echenique, Journal of Economic Theory, 144: 825--849, 2009.
(doi:10.1016/j.jet.2008.07.001)
A working paper version contains some simple comparative statics.
Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Implementation in the Independent Private Values Model,
with Daniel R. Vincent, Econometrica, 78: 1905--1938, 2010.
(doi:10.3982/ECTA8025)
Multidimensional Mechanism Design: Revenue Maximization and the Multiple-Good Monopoly. A corrigendum,
with Daniel R. Vincent, Journal of Economic Theory, 147: 2492--2493, 2012.
(doi:10.1016/j.jet.2012.09.009)
Dominant-strategy and Bayesian incentive compatibility in multi-object trading environments,
with Daniel R. Vincent, forthcoming in Journal of Mathematical Economics,
( doi:10.1016/j.jmateco.2019.03.002)

Working papers

Strong duality in monopoly pricing,
with Andreas Kleiner, forthcoming in Econometrica, 2019.
(2019 pdf)
Independent goods auctions are `virtually never optimal,'
with Daniel R. Vincent, ASU working paper, 2019.
(2019 pdf)